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Abs t ract
I n t hi s paper we  e s t i ma t e a m odel of the det ermi nant s of econom i c and social
devel opm ent   t hat   t akes seri ousl y t hree of  t he cri t i cism s of  panel   dat a m odel s i n
t he existi ng grow t h l i t erature:  t hat   l ong r un coeff i cients are bi ased because t he
l agged  dependent   vari able i s not   str i ctl y  exogenous;   t hat   t hey  are bi ased because
of slope coeff i cient het erogenei t y;  and t hat  t hey are biased because of
expl anatory vari able endogenei t y.  The m odel  i ndi cates that  t here are str ong
causal relati onshi ps i n bot h di r ecti ons bet w een on the one hand,  econom i c
devel opm ent ,   and  on  t he  ot her,   social  and  pol i t i cal  devel opm ent .
JEL  categori es:   O1 ,   O41
1.   Econom i c Gr o wt h  and  Soci al   De v e l opm ent
The  i nt eracti on bet w een social  and econom i c devel opm ent   i s of  i nt erest  bot h t o econom i sts and t o
social  scienti sts i n  ot her  di scipl i nes.   Ho we v e r ,   t here has  not   as yet   been t hat   mu c h   cross-f ert i l i sati on
bet w een t he  t wo   groups.   Thi s paper  m odel s econom i c and  social  devel opm ent   i n  a wa y   t hat   draw s
on  i nsi ght s f r om   several  areas of  devel opm ent   studi es.
R ecent cont r i but i ons by econom i sts to t he i nt eracti on of social and econom i c devel opm ent  have
been dom i nat ed by t he esti ma t es of  cross-count r y grow t h m odel s surveyed by Levi ne and Zer vos
( 1993) and Tem pl e (1999).  These m odels em ploy i nt ernat i onal  panel  dat a to est i ma t e regression
equat i ons  of  t he  f orm:
∆y i   t   =  a 0  -   a 1⋅y i   t - 1  +  a 2⋅x i   t   +  ui   t ( 1)
wh e r ey i   t   i s   per  capi t a  i ncom e i n count r y i   i n peri od t ,   x i   t   i s a set  of  social  and econom i c vari ables,
and ui   t   a r esidual .   These "grow t h" m odel s are r eall y dynam i c m odel s of  t he l evel  of  i ncom e,   since
t hey  can be  r e-param eteri zed as:
y i   t   =    a 0  +  [ 1  -   a 1] ⋅y i   t - 1  +  a 2⋅x i   t   +  ui   t ( 1a)
The  com ponent s of  x i   t   vary wi del y across di f f erent  studi es.  Physi cal  capit al  usual l y enters i n som e
f orm,  as the neocl assical core to a product i on funct i on t hat  also incl udes vari ables int ended t o
capture the det ermi nant s of factor eff i ciency. These determi nant s can incl ude m easures of or
proxi es for "social capit al", such as ethni c hom ogenei t y,  m easures of civi c spir i t  and educat i on
( K nack and K eefer,  1997;  Johnson and Tem pl e, 1998).  They can also incl ude m easures of
governm ent   pol i cy perf orm ance such as debt - GDP  r ati os or  bl ack ma r ket   f orex prem ia (Eas t erl y
and R ebelo,   1993;   Eas t erl y and Levi ne,   1997),   or  m easures of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent ,   captured by
t he  r ati os  of  vari ous  t ypes  of  asset  hol di ng  t o  GDP  ( Ki ng  and  Levi ne,   1993;   Levi ne,   1997).
Cor r espondi ngl y,   t here i s a l i t erature i n pol i t i cal  science i nvest i gat i ng t he det ermi nant s of  m easures
of social and pol i t i cal devel opm ent .  The dependent  vari able can be a m easure of dem ocracy or
pol i t i cal  /   civi l   r i ght s ( Par k,   1987;   H enderson,   1991,   1993;   Poe  and Tat e,  1994;   Di am ond,   1996),2
or  t he probabi l i t y of  t he out break of  vi ol ence and civi l   di sorder  ( Br em er,   1992;   Ma o z   and R usset,
1993;   Ma n s f i eld and Snyder,   1995;   Col l i er,   1998).   Mo s t   of  t hese papers esti ma t e cross-secti on or
panel   dat a r egressions,   and oft en i ncl ude i ndi cators of  econom i c devel opm ent ,   such as t he l evel  or
grow t h  r ate of  per  capi t a  i ncom e,   as expl anatory  vari ables.
Compa r i son of  t hese t wo   groups of  papers i ndi cates a f undam ent al  draw back i n t he i nt erpretati on
of the est i ma t i on result s. The econom i sts'  papers use singl e equati on est i ma t i on t echni ques and
assum e the exogenei t y of social devel opm ent ,  wh i l st the pol i t i cal scienti sts'  papers assum e the
exogenei t y of econom i c devel opm ent .  "C ross-count r y grow t h regressions do not  resolve causal
i ssues; [t hey] shoul d be vi ew ed as evaluat i ng t he st r engt h of part i al corr elati ons,  and not  as
behavi oural  r elati onshi ps"  ( Levi ne  and  Zer vos,   1993).
1
Fur t her probl em s ari se fr om  t he use of panel  dat asets to est i ma t e the det ermi nant s of social and
econom i c devel opm ent .   Fi r st,   since t he l agged dependent   vari able i s not   str i ctl y exogenous,   singl e-
equat i on t echni ques wi l l   not   del i ver  consi stent  esti ma t es of  t he coeff i cient  a 1  i n equat i on ( 1),   and
t herefore of the l ong run eff ects of xi  t on i ncom e:  som e Inst r um ent al Va r i ables techni que (as in
Ca s ell iet   al . ,   1996)  i s necessary.   Second,   t he a 2  param eters wi l l   vary across count r i es,  unl ess each
count r y exhi bi t s i dent i cal  t astes and t echnol ogy.   The  goal   of  pool ed r egression analysi s i s t hen t o
esti ma t e t he m ean of  t he di str i but i on of  a 2;   but   i f   t here i s any seri al  corr elati on i n t he expl anatory
vari ables,  t hen a panel   dat a r egression t hat   i m poses com m on a 2  val ues across count r i es wi l l   i nduce
seri al  corr elati on  i n  ui   t .   As   a r esult ,   t he  f i t t ed a 2  wi l l   not   r epresent  consi stent  esti ma t es of  t he  cross-
count r y  average of  t he  t r ue  param eter  val ues  ( Pesar an and  Sm i t h,   1995;   Lee et  al . ,   1998).
I n t hi s paper,  we  wi l l  esti ma t e a cross-count r y m odel  of social and econom i c devel opm ent  that
t akes all   t hree of  t hese  probl em s seri ousl y.   Secti on  2  descri bes  t he  m odel i ng  str ategy,   and  Secti on  3
t he  r esult s.  Secti on  4  concl udes.
2.   The   Mo d e l   of  De v e l opm ent
1 Some papers use lags of explanatory variables in order to achieve weak exogeneity; but unless the
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous the regression results cannot be interpreted in a counterfactual
way (Engle and Hendry, 1993), which limits their interest for the policy-maker.3
The mai n purpose of our m odel  i s to det ermi ne t o w hat  extent econom i c devel opm ent  i s a
consequence of social devel opm ent ,  and t o w hat  extent the reverse is tr ue.  In order to produce
consi stent esti ma t es of the i m pact of social factors on econom i c devel opm ent ,  and of econom i c
f actors on social devel opm ent ,  our esti ma t i on t echni que needs t o deal  wi t h t he t hree sources of
param eter  bi as:
( a)  Bi as due  t o  t he  endogenei t y  of  t he  l agged  dependent   vari able i n  a panel .
( b)  Bi as due  t o  slope  param eter  het erogenei t y  i n  a panel .
( c) Bi as due t o t he endogenei t y of t he key i ndi cators of social and econom i c devel opm ent .
I nst r um ent s m ust be found t o i dent i f y equat i ons for each of the i ndi cators of int erest,  so that  a
str uct ural  m odel   ma y   be  esti ma t ed.
Pr obl em  ( a)  coul d be dealt   wi t h by i nst r um ent i ng t he l agged dependent  vari able, for exam ple by
usi ng a GMM  esti ma t or  as i n Ca s ell iet   al .   ( 1996).   But   t he  Pesar an and Sm i t h ( 1995)  r esult s m ean
t hat   wh e n   probl em  ( b)  i s present  such esti ma t i on t echni ques cannot   del i ver  consi stent  esti ma t es of
m ean slope param eters.  Ho we v e r ,   consi stency i n t he esti ma t es of  m ean l ong run slope param eters
can be  achieved by  averaging  t he  dat a over  t i me ,   and  esti ma t i ng  t he  m odel   on  a pure cross-secti on.
2
I t   i s t hi s approach t hat   we   wi l l   f ol l ow  bel ow .   The  ma i n draw back of  t he approach i s t hat   l ags can
no  l onger  be  used  as i nst r um ent s i n  deali ng  wi t h  probl em  ( c),   as t hey  are i n  t he  Ca s ell iet   al .   paper;
so we   need t o  f i nd  "real" i nst r um ent s i n  order  t o  i dent i f y  t he  m odel .
Exi sti ng papers i n t he grow t h l i t erature cont ain dozens of  pot enti all y endogenous vari ables,  and i t
w oul d be heroi c in t he ext r em e to at t em pt to i dent i f y al l  of the i nt eracti ons bet w een them  usi ng
cross-secti on dat a.  I nst ead,  we   wi l l   i dent i f y equat i ons f or  f our  key i ndi cators of  devel opm ent ,   and
l eave t he  r est  of  t he  m odel   i n  r educed f orm.
The f our vari ables are per capi t a i ncom e,  educati on,  healt h and dem ocracy (i . e.,  the degree of
openness i n com peti t i on f or  l egislati ve and executi ve pow er) .   Fi r st  we   present  a t heoreti cal  m odel
t o show  how  equat i ons f or  t hese f our  vari ables mi ght   be i dent i f i ed;  t hen we   deal  wi t h t he quest i on
2 This is proven in Pesaran and Smith (1995). The caveat here is that the parameters will provide
estimates only of the impact of xi on yi. Any cross-country effects of xj on yi will not be captured. The
consistency result applies to any cross-section, whatever the period of averaging; but averaging over a
longer period will reduce the variance in the estimate errors.4
of  m easurem ent.
2. 1  Theoret i cal  m odel
The  m odel   consi sts of  ni ne equat i ons.   Gr eek characters are param eters and Roma n  characters are
vari ables;  endogenous  vari ables are wr i t t en i n  bol d.   The  vari ables are:
y:   l og  per  capi t a  i ncom e
e:  a m easure of  t he  average educati on  l evel
h:   a m easure of  t he  average l evel  of  healt h
k:   t he  l og  per  capi t a  physi cal  capit al  stock
a:   f actor  eff i ciency
d:   t he  degree of  dem ocracy
c e:   t he  cost  of  i nvest me n t   i n  educati on,   net   of  i t s consum pt i on  benefi t s
c h:   t he  cost  of  i nvest me n t   i n  healt h,   net   of  i t s consum pt i on  benefi t s
r:  t he  i nt erest  r ate
n:   t he  l og  per  capi t a  nat ural  r esource stock
v:   a m easure of  ethno-l i ngui sti c di versit y
s:  count r y  size
t :   an i ndi cator  vari able f or  wh e t her  t he  count r y  has  a ma r i t i me   coastl i ne
m:   a vector  of  vari ables capturi ng  cult ural  characteri sti cs
x:   m ean annual   t em perature
The  equat i ons  are:
The  aggregat e product i on  f unct i on:
y  =  a  +  α1⋅e +  α2⋅h  +  α3⋅k  +  α4⋅n( 2)
1  >  α1, α2, α3, α4  >  0
The  det erm inant s of   f act or  eff i ciency:
a  =  β0  +  β1⋅v  +  β2⋅s +  β3⋅t   +  β4⋅d( 3)5
β0, β3  >  0  >  β1,β2
A  resource const raint :
θ⋅y  =  π0  +  π1⋅e +  π2⋅h  +  π3⋅k( 4)
1  >  π1, π2, π3  >  0  >  π0
The  publ i c educat i on  decision:
e =  l n(α1)   +  y  -   c e ( 5)
The  cost  of   educat i on  ( net   of   consum pt i on  benef i t s):
c e  =  γ0  -   γ1⋅v  -   γ2⋅s -   γ3⋅t   -   γ4⋅m  -   γ5⋅d  -   γ6⋅y  -   γ7⋅h  +  r( 6)
γ1, γ3, γ5, γ6, γ7  >  0
The  publ i c heal t h  decision:
h  =  l n(α2)   +  y  -   c h ( 7)
The  cost  of   heal t h  ( net   of   consum pt i on  benef i t s):
c h  =  δ0  -   δ1⋅v  -   δ2⋅s -   δ3⋅t   -   [ δ4  -   δ4' ⋅x]⋅x  -   δ5⋅d  -   δ6⋅y  -   δ7⋅e +  r( 8)
δ0, δ4, δ4' , δ5, δ6, δ7  >  0
The  pri vate i nvestme n t   decision:
k  =  l n(α3)   +  y  -   r( 9)
The  det erm inant s of   t he  degree  of   dem ocracy:
d  =  ζ0  +  ζ1⋅v  +  ζ2⋅s +  ζ3⋅t   +  ζ4⋅m  +  ζ5⋅e +  ζ6⋅y  +  ζ7⋅h( 10)
ζ2, ζ3, ζ5, ζ6  >  0
Equat i on ( 2)  i s a l og-l i near  aggregate product i on f unct i on.   The  t wo   hum an capit al  t erms   ( e and h)
are to be t hought  of as stock vari ables: t here is const ant depreciati on of t he st ock t hrough
mo r t ali t y,  di sease and forget f ul ness. Hi gher l evels of healt h and educat i on can i ncrease the
product i vi t y of  t he popul ati on f or  t wo   r easons.  Fi r st,   t hey can i ncrease t he i nherent  product i vi t y of6
t he  average wo r ker.   Second,   t hey  ma y   be  associated wi t h  l ow er  f ert i l i t y  r ates,  and  so a r educt i on  i n
t he proport i on of  t he popul ati on bel ow  wo r ki ng age.  I n t he absence of  an i nst r um ent   f or  a f ert i l i t y
equat i on,   i t   i s not   possibl e t o  separate t hese  t wo   eff ects.
Equat i on (3) expresses the i dea that  the eff i ciency of resource use m ight  depend on soci al and
cult ural factors. On  t he basi s of the evi dence i n East erl y and Levi ne (1997),  we  a l l ow  for the
possibi l i t y t hat  greater ethno-l i ngui sti c diversit y (v) reduces eff i ciency. We  a l so all ow  for t he
possibi l i t y  t hat   mo r e dem ocracy ( d)  aff ects eff i ciency.  Thi s eff ect  coul d  wo r k  t hrough  t he  f orma t i on
of  social  capit al  ( Ha r di n,   1992;   K nack and K eefer,  1997),  or through a l i nk bet w een dem ocracy
and (good or bad) pol i cy choices, or through a l i nk bet w een dem ocracy and peace (Br e mme r ,
1992;M aoz and R usset,   1993).   I n t he absence of  appropri ate i nst r um ent s,  t hese l i nks wi l l   r em ain
uni dent i f i ed in our m odel .  The causal chain fr om  pol i t y t o pol i cy to econom i c perf orm ance is
captured i n  r educed f orm,   i n  t he  param eter  β4.   I n  addi t i on,   we   all ow   f or  t he  possibi l i t y  t hat   count r y
size ( s)  aff ects eff i ciency:  l arger  count r i es mi ght   be  mo r e di f f i cult   t o  m anage  ( count r y  size i s one  of
t he  vari ables i ncl uded  i n  t he  dat a set  of  Ki ng  and  Levi ne,   1993).   Fi nal l y,   t he  vari able t   i s i ncl uded  t o
t est t he hypot hesi s that  count r i es w it h access to t he sea are m ore eff i cient,  because costs of
i nt ernat i onal   t r ade are l ow er.
Equat i on (4) i s a resource constr aint .  Let t i ng capi t als represent l evels rather t han l ogs,  t he
const r aint   i s:
S  =  Y
θ  =  λe⋅E  +  λh⋅H  +  λk⋅K( 4a)
wh e r e S  i s t ot al  saving,   θ  i s t he elasti cit y of  saving wi t h r espect  t o i ncom e and t he λi   are r ates of
depreciati on for t he t hree types of capit al:  i n equi l i bri um ,  i nvest me n t  wi l l  be equal  t o t he
depreciati on r ate t i me s   t he capit al  stock.   Let t i ng π1  r epresent  t he share of  educati on i nvest me n t   i n
t ot al  i nvest me n t ,   π2  t he share of  i nvest me n t   i n healt h,   π3  t he share of  physi cal  capit al  i nvest me n t ,
and π0  =  l n(λe) ⋅π1  +  l n(λh) ⋅π2  +  l n(λk) ⋅π3,   t he  const r aint   can be  wr i t t en as equat i on  ( 4).
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Equat i on ( 5)  states t hat   publ i c educati on expendi t ure i s at  t he l evel  at  wh i ch t he ma r gi nal   r eturn t o
3 Since the λi are less than unity, and the ln(λi) are less than zero, π0 is less than zero.7
educt i on equal s i t s perceived ma r gi nal   cost,   c e.
4  ( I n almo s t   all   count r i es i t   i s t he governm ent   t hat
decides t he l evel  of  educati on expendi t ure,  at  l east  at  t he ma r gi n. )   Thi s ma r gi nal   cost  i s net   of  any
consum pt i on benefi t s that  are perceived t o ari se fr om  educat i on:  educati on i s bot h a consum er
good  and  a capit al  good.   Equat i on  ( 6)  all ow s  f or  t he  perceived  consum pt i on  benefi t s t o  vary  across
count r i es.  Hi gher  l evels of  dem ocracy mi ght   i ncrease t he val ue att ached t o educati on:   i t   cert ainl y
i ncreases observance of  r i ght s t o personal   i nt egri t y ( Poe  and Tat e,  1994)  wh i ch mi ght   pl ausibl y be
posi t i vel y corr elated w it h educat i on l evels; governm ent s w hich do not  val ue hum an ri ght s are
unl i kel y t o val ue educat i on.  Mo r e openness t o t r ade m ight  also increase the val ue at t ached to
educati on consum pt i on ( "tr avel  broadens t he mi nd").   As   l ong as t he i ncom e elasti cit y of  dem and
f or educati on i s posi t i ve,  hi gher levels of y ought  to l ead to hi gher levels of e. A mo r e healt hy
popul ati on m i ght  val ue educat i on m ore, because educati on and heal t h are com plem ents in
consum pt i on.   Mo r eover,   a hi gher  degree of  ethno-l i ngui sti c di versit y  mi ght   cause mo r e wo r t h  t o  be
att ached t o  educati on,   because second-l anguage  l i t eracy wi l l   be  mo r e val uabl e.  We   also all ow   f or  a
set  of  cult ural  f actors ( m)   t o  aff ect  t he  val ue  pl aced on  educati on.   m  i ncl udes  i ndi cators f or  wh e t her
t he count r y has been col oni zed by B ri t ain or Fr ance: H enderson (1991;  1993) argues t hat  a
count r y' s coloni al  experi ence can i nfl uence t he devel opm ent   of  t he degree of  observance of  r i ght s
t o personal   i nt egri t y and ot her  m easures of  social  devel opm ent .   m  also i ncl udes t he f r acti on of  t he
popul ati on report i ng adherence to Islam  and C hri sti anit y:  Poe and Tate (1994) and Park (1987)
argue t hat  reli gi ous adherence is equal l y i m port ant in det ermi ni ng t he degree of observance of
hum an  r i ght s.  I f   t here are no  consum pt i on  benefi t s of  educati on,   t hen  c e  wi l l   equal   t he i nt erest  r ate,
r .
Equat i on ( 7)  expresses an equival ence betw een the m argi nal  return t o heal t h expendi t ure and it s
ma r gi nal   cost  net   of  consum pt i on benefi t s,  c h.   Equat i on ( 8)  i ndi cates t he possibl e det ermi nant s of
c h,   and i s analogous t o equat i on ( 6).   The  one di f f erence i s t hat   we   assum e t hat   t he val ue pl aced on
healt h i s not  aff ected by cult ural factors; but  the cost  of del i veri ng a cert ain l evel of heal t h does
depend on t he average tem perature in t he count r y,  x.  If  extr em es of tem perature are unhealt hy,
t hen ch( . )   wi l l   be  non-m onot oni c i n  x,   and  t he  param eters δ4  and  δ4'   all ow   f or  t hi s.
4 Note that in a log-linear production function, the log of the marginal product of e is equal to the log of
the average product, (y - e) plus the log of the elasticity of output with respect to e, ln(α1).8
Equat i on (9) states an equival ence betw een the m argi nal  cost of physi cal capit al (r )  and t he
ma r gi nal   r eturn.   Thi s equat i on  coul d  be  m odi f i ed by  an eff i ciency expression  simi l ar  t o  equat i on  ( 3),
dri vi ng a w edge bet w een ma r gi nal   product   and ma r gi nal   cost,   t o capture t he possibi l i t y t hat   som e
count r i es have l ess eff i cient  capit al  ma r ket s t han ot hers;  but   t hi s w oul d l eave unal t ered t he general
f orm  of  t he  f i nal   equat i ons  t o  be  esti ma t ed.
The  f i nal   equat i on  i n  t he  m odel ,   equat i on  ( 10),   i ndi cates t he  pot enti al  det ermi nant s of  dem ocracy.  I t
ma y   be  t he  case t hat   hi gher  ma t eri al  i ncom e  prom ot es dem ocracy ( Par k,   1987),   or  t hat   mo r e hi ghl y
educated societi es are mo r e dem ocrati c.  The  existence of  a coastl i ne  ma y   encourage t he  dem ocrati c
process, because it  ma k e s  i t  easier for resident s to fl ee fr om  aut hori t ari an governm ent s. Cul t ural
f actors coul d i nfl uence t he evol ut i on of a dem ocrati c process because of thei r  associati on w i t h
hum an r i ght s observance,   di scussed above.   Count r y size coul d also have an eff ect:   l arger  count r i es
mi ght  be m ore dif f i cult  for an authori t ari an regime  t o m anage,  ceteris pari bus.Et hno-l i ngui sti c
di versit y mi ght   prom ot e dem ocracy,  because i t   ma k e s   i t   mo r e di f f i cult   f or  a singl e part y t o acquir e
t he uncondi t i onal  support  of a large fr acti on of t he popul ati on;  or i t  mi ght  prom ot e
authori t ari anism ,  because of  a l ack of  social  capit al.
Equat i ons ( 2-10)  can be solved i n a part i all y r educed f orm  t hat   permi t s us t o i nvest i gat e t he l i nks
bet w een four of the key factors in soci al and econom i c devel opm ent :  incom e (y),  educati on (e),
healt h  ( h)  and  dem ocracy ( d).   The  f our  equat i ons  are show n  bel ow .
I ncom e:
y  =  {β0  +  β1⋅v  +  β2⋅s +  β3⋅t   +  β4⋅d  +  [ α1  -   α3⋅π1/ π3] ⋅e +  [ α2  -   α3⋅π2/ π3] ⋅h  +  α4⋅n}
×  {π3/ [ π3  -   θ⋅α3] }( 11)
Educat i on:
e =  {l n(α1/ α3)   -   γ0  +  γ5⋅ζ0  -   π0/ π3  +  [ γ1  +  γ5⋅ζ1] ⋅v  +  [ γ2  +  γ5⋅ζ2] ⋅s +  [ γ3  +  γ5⋅ζ3] ⋅t
+  [ γ4  +  γ5⋅ζ4] ⋅m  +  [ γ6  +  γ5⋅ζ6  +  θ/ π3] ⋅y  +  [ γ7  +  γ5⋅ζ7  -   π2/ π3] ⋅h}
÷  [ 1  -   γ5⋅ζ5  +  π1/ π3]( 12)
He a l t h:9
h  =  {l n(α2/ α3)   -   δ0  -   π0/ π3  +  δ1⋅v  +  δ2⋅s +  δ3⋅t   +  [ δ4  -   δ4' ⋅x]⋅x  +  δ5⋅d  +  [ δ6  +  θ/ π3] ⋅y
+  [ δ7  -   π1/ π3] ⋅e} ÷  [ 1  +  π2/ π3]( 13)
D em ocracy:
d  =  {ζ0  +  ζ5⋅[ l n(α1/ α3)   -   γ0  -   π0/ π3]   +  [ ζ1  +  ζ5⋅γ1] ⋅v  +  [ ζ2  +  ζ5⋅γ2] ⋅s +  [ ζ3  +  ζ5⋅γ3] ⋅t
+  [ ζ4  +  ζ5⋅γ4] ⋅m  +  [ ζ6  +  ζ5⋅[ γ6  +  θ/ π3] ] ⋅y  +  [ ζ7  +  ζ5⋅[ γ7  -   π2/ π3] ] ⋅h}
÷  [ 1  -   γ5⋅ζ5]( 14)
y  i s   i dent i f i ed by  n;   h  i s   i dent i f i ed by  x;
5  e and  d  are i dent i f i ed by  m  ( wh i ch r epresents mo r e t han  one
vari able).e  cannot   be i dent i f i ed i n equat i on ( 14),   nor  can d i n equat i on ( 12).   Ot herwi se,  t here are
t hree endogenous  vari ables on  t he  r i ght   hand  side  of  each equat i on.   No t e t hat   t he  eff ect  of  changes
i n e and h on ot her  vari ables i s am biguous:   educati on and healt h are i nherentl y good f or  i ncom e,
but  i n t hi s part i all y reduced form a n  i ncrease in e or h al so has crow di ng out  eff ects. Mo r e
expendi t ure on  hum an  capit al  m eans l ess expendi t ure on  physi cal  capit al.
A ssum ing t hat   t he r eali zed val ues of  each dependent   vari able i n t he i
t h  count r y are det ermi ned by
equat i ons of the form o f  (11-14) pl us som e i di osyncrati c residual  eff ect ui ,  the system  can be
esti ma t ed on a cross-secti on of count r i es. We  w i l l  do t hi s using t he dat a descri bed i n t he next
secti on.
2. 2  M easurem ent   of   variabl es i n  t he  m odel
Fol l ow i ng  previous  papers on  grow t h,   i ncom e  i s m easured by  t he  per capi t a GDP  f i gures r eport ed
i n t he Penn Wo r l d Tabl es ( He s t on and S u mme r s,  1991).   As   di scussed above,   t hese f i gures are not
used i n panel   dat a f orm,   but   are averaged over  t i me .   y i s m easured as t he l ogari t hm  of  t he 30-year
average of  PW T  GDP  f r om   1960.   Si nce t hi s l ong  r un  average mi ght   be  i nt erpreted as a m easure of
perm anent  incom e,  we  wi l l  com pare the result s of usi ng t he PW T fi gures w it h an al t ernat i ve
m easure of  perm anent   i ncom e:   t he  w ealt h  dat aset  presented i n Di xon and Ha mi l t on ( 1996).   Thi s i s
an att em pt  t o  m easure t he  curr ent  present  di scount ed val ue  of  hum an,   physi cal  and  nat ural  r esource
capit al  i n  each count r y  of  t he  wo r l d.   A  caveat  t o  t he  com pari son  of  t he  t wo   sets of  r esult s r eport ed
5 As long as n, the value of natural resources (including land fertility), is measured accurately enough,
temperature ought not to affect output independently of n.10
bel ow  i s t hat   t he w ealt h f i gures are not   t he r esult   of  averaging over  t i me ,   t he ori gi nal   dat a bei ng
r eport ed as a pure cross-secti on,   not   a panel .
The  m easure of  dem ocracy i s t aken f r om   t he  Pol i t y-I I I dd a t aset  ( M cLaughl i n  et  al . ,   1998),   wh i ch i s
a revision of the Pol i t y-I I  dat aset (Gu r r ,  1997).  These datasets provi de i nforma t i on on G urr ' s
m easure of  dem ocracy f or  each count r y i n each year,   wh i ch we   average over  t i me .   For   each year,
dem ocracy is m easured on a ten-poi nt  scale. Count r i es are aw arded up t o t hree point s for the
com peti t i veness of pol i t i cal part i cipat i on,  that  is, "the ext ent to w hi ch alt ernat i ve preferences for
pol i cy and leadership can be i n t he pol i t i cal arena".
6 Pol i t i es in w hi ch opposi t i on part i es are
harassed, suppressed or banned fr om  part i cipat i ng i n el ecti ons are aw arded l ow er scores. Up  t o
t wo   poi nt s are aw arded f or  t he com peti t i veness of  executi ve r ecrui t me n t ,   t hat   i s,  "the extent  t hat
prevail i ng  m odes  of  advancem ent  gi ve  subordi nat es equal   opport uni t i es t o  becom e superordi nat es".
Pol i t i es in w hi ch the el ectorate have m ore say in t he choi ce of the chi ef executi ve are aw arded
hi gher scores. Count r i es are aw arded up t o one poi nt  for the openness of executi ve recrui t me n t
( m easuri ng any l i mi t s on w ho can stand f or  electi on t o t he executi ve),   and up t o f our  poi nt s f or
const r aint s on executi ve decision-ma k i ng.   Pol i t i es i n wh i ch t he chief  executi ve i s not   account able
f or hi s acti ons (f or exam ple, by havi ng t o answ er to a l egislature) are aw arded l ow er scores.
Al t hough t he we i ght i ng i mp l i cit   i n t he aggregate dem ocracy i ndex i s arbi t r ary,   t he Pol i t y-I I   dat aset
has been em ployed eff ecti vel y i n a wi de r ange of  cont exts i n pol i t i cal  science ( M cLaughl i n et  al . ,
1998).
7
A  num ber  of  alt ernat i ves are avail able i n m easuri ng t he stock of  educati on.   Ba r r o and Lee ( 1993)
provi de t he m ost  sophi sti cated m easure based on years in school ,  but  for a li mi t ed range of
count r i es,  and  wi t h  str ong  assum pti ons  about   t he  r elati ve  qual i t y  of  school i ng  across t he  wo r l d.   We
use a mo r e basi c m easure i nst ead:  t he f r acti on of  t he adul t   popul ati on t hat   i s l i t erate.  Thi s m easure
has t he advant age t hat   i t   i s avail able f or  a wi der  r ange of  count r i es,  and i t   i s a di r ect  m easure of  an
6 Quotations are from Gurr (1997).
7 With the averaging, the distribution of the democracy measure is approximately continuous, but
censored: dividing the score by ten, observations all lie on the interval [0,1]. We estimated both linear and
logit regressions for the democracy equation, and found very little difference in the effects of explanatory
variables at the mean. The main tables report the linear regression results, but the logit regression results are
available on request. The same goes for the literacy measures discussed next.11
out put ,   r ather  t han an i nput - based m easure.  The  dat a are t aken f r om  UNESCO  ( 1998).   The  adul t
l i t eracy r ate i s a stock  of  hum an  capit al  bui l t   up  over  ma n y   years;  one  di f f i cult y  i n  usi ng  i t   alongsi de
i ncom e i n a str uct ural  m odel   i s t hat   adul t   l i t eracy i n 1960 i s unl i kel y t o depend on i ncom e i n 1960,
but  incom e i n 1960 i s li kel y t o depend on l i t eracy in 1960.  If  we  we r e int erested solely i n t he
[li t eracy ﬁ   i ncom e] part   of  t he m odel ,   we   shoul d wa n t   t o average t he l i t eracy dat a i n t he sam e
wa y   as t he  i ncom e  dat a;  but   t hi s i s not   t r ue  wh e n   t he  [incom e ﬁ   l i t eracy] part   of  t he  m odel   i s also
of  i nt erest.   Ha v i ng  t r i ed bot h  past   averaged and  curr ent  l i t eracy r ates,  we   r eport   t he  r esult s of  usi ng
t he l att er,   t hough t he choi ce does not   ma k e   a great  deal  of  di f f erence t o t he out com e.  The  sam e
r em arks are t r ue of  t he m easure of  healt h used i n t he m odel ,   ( l og)  l i f e expectancy at  bi r t h.   The  l i f e
expectancy fi gures used to generate the result s report ed below  are taken fr om  t he D i xon and
Ha mi l t on dat aset.
The ot her stock vari able used in t he est i ma t ed m odel  i s the m easure of t he val ue of nat ural
r esources.  The  onl y consi stent  m easure avail able f or  a wi de r ange of  count r i es i s t he one i n Di xon
and H am i l t on dat aset,  wh i ch is report ed just  once for each count r y;  ideall y,  we  wo u l d use an
average f or  t he sam e peri od as i ncom e.   A  caveat  t o t he use of  t he Di xon and Ha mi l t on dat a i s t hat
t here ma y   be  som e m easurem ent  err or,   i f   i n  som e count r i es t here has  been a great  deal  of  vari ati on
i n  t he  val ue  of  nat ural  r esources over  t i me .
The  m easure of  ethno-l i ngui sti c di versit y i s t he mo s t   r ecent  and com prehensive one we   are aw are
of,   presented i n  Kr ain ( 1997).   Thi s m easures t he probabi l i t y t hat   t wo   i ndi vi dual s selected r andom l y
f r om  a count r y' s popul ati on w i l l  speak the sam e nat i ve l anguage.  Count r y si ze fi gures (l og
t housands  of  km ²)   are t aken f r om   CI A  ( 1997),   and  t em perature dat a ( t enths  of  degrees centi grade)
f r om H oare (1998).  For  large count r i es, the t em perature fi gures used are averages over several
l arge popul ati on centr es,  and f or  sm all   count r i es t he t em perature i n t he capit al  cit y;   f urt her  det ail s
are avail able on  r equest .   For   t he  cult ural  vari ables,  i nforma t i on  on  coloni sati on  by  Br i t ain  or  Fr ance
i s t aken f r om   CI A  ( 1997),   and  t he  f r acti on  of  t he  popul ati on  adheri ng  t o  Chr i sti anit y  or  I slam  f r om
Gr i me s   ( 1996).
Wi t h dat a draw n fr om  t hese di sparate sources, there are 114 count r i es in our dat aset usi ng t he
PW T m easure of incom e ("M odel  1"),  and 120 count r i es in t he dat aset usi ng t he D i xon and
Ha mi l t on m easure of  w ealt h ( "M odel   2").   These are l i sted i n A ppendi x 1.   The  sam ple m eans and12
standard devi ati ons of all  cont i nuous vari ables are report ed in Tabl e 1. The m easures of each
vari able are s u mma r i zed as f ol l ow s.
y:   l og  per  capi t a  GDP  i n  $  ( M odel   1);   l og  w ealt h  i n  $  ( M odel   2)
e:  t he  f r acti on  of  t he  adul t   popul ati on  t hat   i s l i t erate
h:   l og  years'   l i f e expectancy
d:   Pol i t y-I I I d  dem ocracy i ndex,   scaled t o  t he  i nt erval   [ 0, 1]
n:   t he  l og  per  capi t a  nat ural  r esource stock  i n  $
v:K rain' s m easure of  ethno-l i ngui sti c di versit y
s:  l og  count r y  size i n  1000  km ²
t :   d u mmy   f or  wh e t her  t he  count r y  has  a ma r i t i me   coastl i ne
m: GBR  ( d u mmy   f or  Br i t i sh coloni es);   FRA  ( d u mmy   f or  Fr ench coloni es);   CHR  ( t he  f r acti on  of  t he
popul ati on  t hat   i s Chr i sti an;  MUS   ( t he  f r acti on  of  t he  popul ati on  t hat   i s Mu s l i m)
x:   m ean annual   t em perature i n  0. 1  degrees centi grade
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable  mean      std. dev.
y (Model 1)*  7.809       0.991
y (Model 2) 10.450       1.667
e  0.767       0.227
h  4.145       0.168
d  0.433       0.355
CHR  0.520       0.385
MUS  0.227       0.355
v  0.415       0.273
n  8.712       1.792
x/100  1.921       0.737
s  5.320       1.891
* The statistics for this variable are based on a sample of 114 countries;
for other variables the sample size is 120.13
In addition to measuring the variables in equations (11-14), we ought to allow for the possibility
that the ui for each equation are spatially correlated. The regression equations include the
regional dummies EUR (Europe), SAM  (South and Central America), AFR (Africa), MDE
(Western Asia) and ASP (the rest of Asia and the Pacific); the baseline intercept in the equations
including regional dummies is for North America. Dummies at a greater degree of geographical
disaggregation were insignificant.
3.  Es t i ma t i on Re s ul t s
The unrestricted reduced form OLS estimates on which the structural model in equations (11-
14) is based are reported in Appendix 2. The full model corresponding to equations (11-14) is
not reported here, but is available on request. Tables 2-3 below report the result of imposing
those restrictions on the model that minimize the Hannan-Quinn model selection criterion, when
the model is estimated by FIML.
8 (The model resulting from minimizing the Schwartz criterion
is similar, but omits a few explanatory variables significant at the 5% level. The model resulting
from using the Akaike criterion is less restrictive than the one reported here; standard errors are
higher than those in Tables 1-2, but coefficient magnitudes  are similar. None of the additional
coefficients in the Akaike-based model is statistically significant.) Table 4 reports some
corresponding diagnostic statistics, including White's test for heteroskedasticity. The null of
homoskedasticity can be rejected at the 10% level in Model 1 and at the 1% level in Model 2,
so the t-ratios in Tables 2-3 are based on White-corrected standard errors ("H.C.S.E."); the
uncorrected standard errors ("std. err.") are also shown for comparison. In order to give an
impression of the relative importance of different effects, the final column in Tables 2-3 reports
the product of the estimated coefficients and the variables' standard deviations from Table 1.
The first equation in Tables 2-3 is for the variable y, measured as per capi t a GDP and wealth
respectively. The y equations in the two tables are qualitatively similar, but with higher
elasticities in the second, wealth-based regression. By far the strongest relationship in the
8 For the purposes of model selection country location is treated as a single variable, so individual
equations include either all or none of the regional dummies.14
Table 2: Model 1 Parameter Estimates
y equation 
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -20.0450      3.40260     3.63790 -5.51005      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
n 0.21588      0.03461     0.04101      5.26408      0.38686
s -0.06551      0.02551     0.02972 -2.20424     -0.12388
d  0.17984      0.22980     0.24052      0.74771      0.06384
e -2.43770      0.81680     0.77601 -3.14133     -0.55336
h  6.78100      0.94523     1.02220      6.63373      1.13921
σ = 0.4714
e equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -2.39410      0.79874     0.86844 -2.75678      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
FRA -0.06402      0.02646     0.02644 -2.42133      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MUS -0.17887      0.03175     0.03470 -5.15476     -0.06350
v  0.02417    0.04585     0.04909      0.49236      0.00660
y  0.07445      0.03802     0.04349      1.71189      0.07378
h  0.63223      0.25422     0.28218      2.24052      0.10621
σ = 0.1032
h equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept 3.61320      0.10963     0.12268     29.45223      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
EUR -0.02456      0.02308     0.01467 -1.67416      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
SAM -0.04879      0.02388     0.01637 -2.98045      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
AFR -0.12375      0.03059     0.02835 -4.36508      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MDE -0.02540      0.02790     0.02101 -1.20895      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
ASP -0.04386      0.02408     0.01785 -2.45714      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
s -0.00575      0.00285     0.00322 -1.78571     -0.01087
t  0.03181      0.00986     0.01238      2.56947      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
x/100  0.05106      0.02625     0.02044     2.49804      0.03763
x²/100 -0.19018      0.07420     0.06832 -2.78367     -0.00103
v -0.02584      0.01714     0.01686 -1.53262     -0.00705
y  0.04312      0.01587     0.01720      2.50698      0.04273
e  0.32889      0.07156     0.07181      4.58000      0.07466
σ = 0.0562
d equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -1.71770      0.37430     0.43955 -3.90786      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
EUR 0.31898      0.13713     0.14031      2.27339      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
SAM 0.12208      0.13869     0.14624      0.83479      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
AFR 0.18427      0.15290     0.16793      1.09730      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MDE -0.30775      0.15308     0.16441 -1.87184      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
ASP 0.28012      0.14860     0.16234      1.72551      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
CHR 0.13470      0.08047     0.10144      1.32788      0.05186
GBR 0.24390      0.05266     0.04861      5.01749      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
FRA 0.13736      0.06606     0.06087      2.25661      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
y  0.23190      0.04155     0.04986      4.65102      0.22981
σ = 0.220315
Table 3: Model 2 Parameter Estimates
y equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -27.3030      4.96270     4.10820 -6.64598      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
n  0.46425      0.04902 0.05723      8.11200      0.83194
s -0.12023      0.03167     0.03434 -3.50116     -0.22735
d  1.30230      0.36259     0.33262      3.91528      0.46232
e -3.93820      1.18100     0.99591 -3.95437     -0.89397
h  8.88030      1.38410     1.14740      7.73950      1.49189
σ = 0.7015
e equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -3.39350      0.51423     0.59127 -5.73934      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
FRA -0.04390      0.01975     0.02148 -2.04376      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MUS -0.15427      0.02680     0.03130 -4.92875     -0.05477
v  0.06876      0.03864     0.04086      1.68282      0.01877
y  0.02028      0.01233     0.01426      1.42216      0.03381
h  0.95655      0.14522     0.16864      5.67214      0.16070
σ = 0.0979
h equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept 3.74180      0.07812     0.07542      49.6128      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
EUR -0.01568      0.02790     0.01338 -1.17190      ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
SAM -0.03223      0.02796     0.01384 -2.32876      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
AFR -0.11940      0.03387     0.02367 -5.04436      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MDE -0.00419      0.03243     0.02062 -0.20320      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
ASP -0.03321      0.02842     0.01747 -1.90097      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
s -0.00623      0.00263     0.00271 -2.29889     -0.01178
t  0.03195      0.01079     0.01321      2.41862      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
x/100  0.05233      0.03088     0.02396      2.18406      0.03857
x²/100 -0.20226      0.08795     0.07968 -2.53840     -0.00110
v -0.04604      0.02157     0.02185 -2.10709     -0.01257
e  0.35083      0.07655     0.07455      4.70597      0.07964
y  0.01852      0.00762     0.00808      2.29208      0.03087
σ = 0.0580
d equation
Variable coeff. std. err. H.C.S.E. t ratio      co × sd
Intercept -1.10610      0.25016     0.27290 -4.05313      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
EUR 0.21667      0.12379     0.12834      1.68825      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
SAM 0.02042      0.12299     0.12457      0.16392      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
AFR 0.06972      0.13056     0.13199      0.52822      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
MDE -0.31632      0.13709     0.13790 -2.29384      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
ASP 0.17533      0.12955     0.13113      1.33707      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
CHR 0.12899      0.06874     0.08336      1.54738      0.04966
GBR 0.21218      0.04863     0.04962      4.27610      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
FRA 0.09231      0.05603     0.05081      1.81677      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
y  0.12475      0.01954     0.02268      5.50044      0.20796
σ = 0.218916
Table 4: Diagnostic and Descriptive Statistics for Models 1-2
A. RESIDUAL CORRELATION
Model 1
d            y            e
y -0.27707
e -0.07197      0.12977
h  0.16400 -0.76210 -0.34637
Model 2
d            y            e
y -0.50250
e -0.18549      0.47873










Retrictions test  23.7795 [0.7397]
(χ²(29))
C. MODEL SELECTION CRITERIA
Restr. Unrestr.
Model 1
Schwartz -13.605      -12.593
Hannan-Quinn -14.104      -13.506




Akaike -14.163      -13.362
D. HETEROSKEDASTICITY TESTS
Model 1
Restricted F(210,703) = 0.9901 [0.0599]
Unrestricted F(210,630) = 0.9901 [0.5277]
Model 2
Restricted F(210,757) = 1.3872 [0.0011]
Unrestricted F(210,685) = 1.2726 [0.0131]
E. UNRESTRICTED REDUCED FORM R²(LM)S
Model 1  0.6445
Model 2  0.664517
regression is the effect of higher life expectancy. A one standard deviation increase in log life
expectancy leads to a per capi t a GDP level 114% higher, and a per capi t a wealth level 149%
higher. Whilst part of this substantial effect might be attributable to the beneficial impact of
health on worker productivity, a large part may to be due to an unidentified relationship
between health and fertility. (The magnitude of the effect is less surprising when one bears in
mind that the maximum observation of GDP is 47 times greater than the minimum, and the
maximum observation of wealth is 596 times greater than the minimum: there is a lot of
variance to be explained.)
Education also has a significant effect on income, but the effect is negative. This is consistent
with the theoretical model, implying that in the typical country α1⋅π3 < α3⋅π1. The reduced
productivity resulting from the crowding out of physical capital investment when education
expenditure rises more than offsets the benefits to productivity of the better average education
levels. This is consistent with rational behaviour because education also has consumption
benefits. Ce t eris pari bus, a one standard deviation reduction in literacy is associated with a per
capi t a GDP level that is 55% higher and a per capi t a wealth level that is 89% higher. The net
effect of education on income can still be positive, however, if education influences health
levels. This possibility will be addressed in the discussion of the h regression, and later in the
discussion of general equilibrium effects. The education effects estimated here are difficult to
compare directly with those in previous studies, which include educational attainment and
physical capital stock measures as independent variables. But with the negative education
coefficient in the income equation and the positive income coefficient in the education equation
below, it is not surprising that most previous studies using single equation techniques have
found no strong overall correlation between the two variables (Temple, 1999).
Income is also influenced positively by the stock of natural capital, and negatively by country
size, although the second effect is relatively small in both versions of the model. In Model 2
there is a significant positive coefficient on the democracy variable, d, implying that a one
standard deviation increase in the democracy index leads to a 46% increase in income. This
squares with other papers which have also found a positive relationship by using measures of
political development such as the infrequency of coups d'état (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
However, the result is fragile: the democracy coefficient is insignificant in both Model 1 in18
Table 2, and in the specification of Model 2 selected using the Akaike criterion, which includes
(insignificant) region dummies.
The most striking aspect of the second equation, for education qua the literacy rate, is that
although there is a positive coefficient on income, it is quite small. The coefficient is significant
at only the 10% level in Model 1 and is insignificant in Model 2. On average, higher income
appears neither to increase the consumption demand for education, nor to generate financial
resources for investment in education. However, the impact of health on education is highly
significant; a one standard deviation increase in life expectancy is on average associated with an
11 percentage point increase in the literacy rate in Model 1 and a 16 percentage point increase in
Model 2. The sum of the income and life expectancy effects are very similar in the two models,
and one interpretation of the figures is that life expectancy and GDP / wealth are competing
measures of the index of material well-being that is the true determinant of education demand.
Conventional measures of material well-being have little direct effect on education, though they
may have an indirect effect through a positive relationship between health and wealth. To put it
another way: increases in per capi t a GDP are not associated with increases in the demand for
basic education unless they deliver a higher general quality of life.
Aside from income and life expectancy, the only other significant determinants of education are
cultural factors. There is a significantly negative coefficient on the French colonisation dummy:
ceteris pari bus, former French colonies have a literacy rate estimated to be six percentage points
lower in Model 1 and four percentage points lower in Model 2.
The third equation, for life expectancy, is the one in which effect of the region dummies are
both large and significant. South America, the Asia-Pacific region and Africa all have life
expectancy rates that are ceteris pari bus significantly lower than those in North America. By far
the strongest effect is in Africa: in both models being African instead of North American
reduces life expectancy by 12%; being Asian or South American reduces life expectancy only
by 3-4%.
9 Recall that life expectancy is significant in the two income equations, but the regional
9 The sample standard deviation of log life expectancy is much lower than that of log income (see Table
1); and likewise the estimated effects of explanatory variables in terms of percentage changes are much
lower in the life expectancy equation.19
dummies are not. Africa's "growth tragedy" (Easterly and Levine, 1997) appears to be a health
tragedy. Africa's problem is not that it is a particularly inefficient continent, but that it is a
particularly disease-ridden one. Similarly, it is in the life expectancy equation that the measure
of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation appears with a negative coefficient; but the coefficient is
significant at the 5% level only in Model 2. A one standard deviation increase in this variable is
estimated to reduce life expectancy by just over 1% in Model 2 and just under 1% in Model 1.
It is unclear why the negative impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation works through life
expectancy rather than directly in the income equation.
Both income and education have large, positive, significant effects on life expectancy. A one
standard deviation increase in literacy increases life expectancy by 7-8%; for income the figure
is 3-4%. Since both education and income depend positively on health, this means that the
equilibrium impact of income on education will be greater than the small direct effect discussed
above, and that the negative direct impact of education on income will be offset by a positive
equilibrium effect. These net effects will be evaluated later.
Health is also influenced by climatic factors. There is a significant quadratic relationship
between life expectancy and annual average temperature, with the maximum life expectancy at
around 13
O centigrade in both models; and countries with a coastline have a life expectancy that
is around 3% higher than similar countries with no coastline. Size matters too: a one standard
deviation increase in log country size is associated with a 1% reduction in life expectancy. This
may reflect a lower level of efficiency of public healthcare provision in large countries, for a
given income level.
The equation for democracy indicates that income levels have a strong and highly significant
impact on polity. In Model 1 a one standard deviation increase in log income is associated with
a 23 percentage point increase in the democracy score; in Model 2 the figure is 21%. At the
national level, democracy (and the quality of life from the human rights that go with it) are a
luxury item. As in other studies, we find that patterns of colonialisation affect present-day
polities. Former British colonies have a democracy score that is ceteris pari bus 21-24
percentage points higher than other countries; for former French colonies the figure is 9-14%.
There is also one strong significant regional effect: countries in the Mid-East (including both20
Israel and its Arab neighbours) have a democracy score that is ceteris pari bus 32 percentage
points lower than the score for North America; the gap relative to other parts of the world is
even greater.
Having estimated the structural model, it is possible to compute the equilibrium impact of an
exogenous shock to each of the dependant variables on all of the variables in the system.
10 These
effects are listed in Table 5 for both Model 1 and Model 2, and are presented in the following
way. Each column represents the impact of a shock to one of the four equations (11-14) on each
of the four dependant variables. The magnitude of the shock is one standard deviation of the
column variable, and the impact is measured in standard deviations of the row variable. For
example, the second figure in the first column for Model 1 (1.659) indicates the impact on e of
a shock to the y equation equal to one standard deviation of y, the impact being measured in
standard deviations of e. The results for the two models are broadly similar (so we have some
confidence in their robustness), but care should be taken in comparing the two sets of results
because the standard deviation of the income measure (and hence the normalisation) in Model 1
is rather different from that in Model 2.
The figures on the main diagonal are the multiplier effects, all of which are positive. The largest
multiplier effect is for h (estimated at 2.08 in Model 1 and 1.86 in Model 2); the smallest is for
d (1.06 and 1.23). The only negative figures are for the impact of shocks to the e equation on y,
and via y on d; these figures are quite small, however, because the negative direct impact of e
on y (Tables 2-3) is largely offset by the positive impact of e on h, and of h on y. Otherwise,
the equilibrium impact of a shock to one variable on others in the system is large and positive.
In many cases a positive shock of one standard deviation to the equation for a variable leads to
increases in other variables greater than one standard deviation, so there are many virtuous
spirals in the system.
10 The impact of shocks to exogenous variables is given in the reduced form coefficients reported in
Appendix 2.21
Table 5: Normalized Effects of Exogenous Shocks
The columns show the normalized equilibrium impact on each of the four
dependent variables of an exogenous shock in each of the four equations.
For example, the second figure in the first column (1.659) indicates the
impact on e of a shock to the y equation equal to one standard deviation of
y, the impact being measured in standard deviations of e.
Model 1
     Equation
y e h d
Variable
y 1.452 -0.086  1.623  0.094
e 1.659  1.216  1.487  0.052
h 0.726  0.519  2.080  0.130
d 1.052 -0.056  1.055  1.061
Model 2
     Equation
y e h d
Variable
y 1.398 -0.235  0.926  0.366
e 0.586  1.410  1.454  0.154
h 0.548  0.625  1.863  0.143
d 0.872 -0.215  0.576  1.227
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
A "shock" in this cross-section context is an idiosyncratic effect making the level of income,
education, health or democracy of a country greater or less than what one might expect, given
the country's other socio-economic characteristics. Since the model we have estimated is a
partially reduced form, it would be incautious to read too much into the regression residuals; we
cannot attribute the appearance of certain countries in either tail of a residual distribution to a
particular reason.
11 However, the figures in Table 5 could be interpreted as the potential impact
on a country's development of idiosyncratic effects (including idiosyncratic government policy)
which raised the level of income, education, health or democracy above the level one would
expect.
12 Policy initiatives related to one variable will have a different impact on development
11 Moreover, the identity of the countries appearing in the tails varies between Model 1 and Model 2.
12 Of course policy is implicitly endogenous in the model; but there will always be a stochastic component
in the determinantion of policy variables that reflects the individual country's genius.22
from policy initiatives related to another. In the absence of a social welfare function converting
values of of y, e, h and d into a single metric (and of estimates of the resource costs of
implementing a certain kind of policy) it is impossible to say which kind of initiative will be
most valuable. But it is striking that the figures in the h columns in Table 5 are generally larger
than those in other columns: idiosyncratic health improvements have more impact on the system
than other idiosyncrasies.
4.  Co nc l usi on
This paper has examined the long run relationship between indicators of social and economic
development taking seriously the potential econometric problems encountered in estimating
cross-country regressions, in particular the endogeneity of the different development indicators.
Our results suggest that there exist a number of virtuous spirals in the process of social and
economic development. Economic growth promotes democratic development, and vice versa;
education is good for health, and health is good for education. Perhaps the most interesting
result to appear is the role of health (measured in terms of life expectancy) in the development
process. First, many of the key explanatory variables used in previous economic growth studies,
such as ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and the "Africa dummy", impact on the economy just
through their effect on health. Second, the shocks to the system that have the largest impact on
development indicators are those to the level of health. Small improvements in life expectancy
can have a large effect on income, education and democracy. The value of good public health
policy and health-promoting foreign aid may be even greater than one might anticipate.
Moreover, the inclusion of a democracy index in the model reinforces a point made i nt er ali a
by Collier (1998), that foreign aid - income transfers from wealthy countries to poorer ones -can
generate Pareto improvements. As is well documented in the political science literature cited
above, democratic countries are less prone to engage in internal or external conflict. Aid that
improves the level of income and health of a country will, on average, make it more democratic
in the long run, and so less prone to violence. Since it is the industrialized world that bears the
brunt of the cost of policing and mediating intra- and international conflicts, aid payments could
be motivated by enlightened self-interest.2324
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Appendi x  1:  Count ries Included  i n  t he  Sam pl e
*i ndi cates i ncl usi on i n M odel   2 onl y
Ethiopia Senegal Turkey Portugal
Nepal Cote d'Ivoire Thailand Greece
Burundi Egypt Cuba* Cyprus
Malawi Zimbabwe P. N. G. Namibia
Uganda Indonesia Iraq Saudi Arabia
Tanzania Zambia Costa Rica Botswana
Viet Nam* Cameroon Iran New Zeland
Sierra Leone Burma Congo Ireland
Niger Mauritania Fiji Israel
Cambodia* Philippines Panama Spain
Burkina Faso Liberia Jamaica Singapore
Gambia Romania Brazil Britain
Kenya Guatemala Mauritius Finland
Mali Morocco Swaziland Italy
Nigeria C. A. R. Poland Netherlands
India Peru Czech Republic Belgium
Madagascar Ecuador Mongolia Austria
Haiti Dominican Republic Malaysia Germany
Benin Jordan Venezuela Kuwait
Sudan El Salvador South Africa France
Togo Syria Uruguay U. S. A.
China Bolivia Hungary Norway
Laos Bulgaria Chile Denmark
Pakistan Lithuania* Trinidad Iceland
Ghana Paraguay Mexico Sweden
Yemen Colombia Guyana Japan
Nicaragua Algeria Argentina Switzerland
Comoros Tunisia Oman Luxembourg
Sri Lanka Albania* South Korea Canada
Honduras Slovakia* Bahrain Australia28